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would have existed. Therefore D can be said to have waived his
rights by failing to avail himself of the "existing adequate remedy."
Any other hypothesis which would serve as well in expediting the
administration of justice could not easily be formulated, although,
as the dissenting opinion indicates, such hypothesis might on another
set of facts permit an accused to be deprived of his right to be
indicted by a fairly constituted grand jury. This problem, however,
can be met and decided when it arises; the facts may well deny the
use of the same hypothesis.
While commencement of a state criminal prosecution by indictment through grand jury action is not essential under the Constitution, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), if this form
of accusatory procedure is used the grand jury must be fairly chosen,
Cassel v. Texas, 839 U.S. 282 (1950). The court did not change
nor did it detract from this rule in the Poret case; it only recognized
that justice cannot be thwarted nor public protection from crime
made a mere sham through allowing criminals to voluntarily procrastinate in the assertion of their constitutional rights. D was fairly
tried and convicted and by his own action waived the right to later
object to matters preliminary to such trial and conviction.
B. F. D.
COunTs-SuPjfVtisoRY PowERs-ENJOnMENT

OF FEDEiAL NAR-

concs AiENT FRom TEsrTIFNCG IN STATE CouaT.-A federal narcotics
agent obtained narcotics from the petitioner under a defective search
warrant. Consequently in a federal prosecution this evidence was
suppressed and the indictment based thereon was dismissed. Thereafter petitioner was charged with possession of narcotics in violation
of state law. He filed a motion in the federal district court to enjoin
the agent from testifying in the state action and thereby submitting
the same evidence against him in the state court which was suppressed in the federal prosecution. Relief was denied and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, that injunctive relief
should be granted. Viewing the question as solely concerning the
federal court's supervisory power over federal law enforcement officers, the majority took the view that the policy of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure governing searches and seizures would be
defeated if a federal officer could use the fruits of an unlawful search
in state proceedings. Four Justices dissented, expressing the view
that the holding of the majority could not properly be rested on
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the federal court's supervisory powers over federal law enforcement
officers, and that the withholding of equitable relief in the instant
case was a proper exercise of the lower court's discretion. Rea v.
United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 292 (1956).
It is commonly recognized that courts have inherent powers to
supervise and to correct the errors or abuses of their officers and subordinates, but it has been held that the Supreme Court of the United
States is invested with judicial powers only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the
classes enumerated in the judicial article of the Constitution. It
cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise,
or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially
legislative or administrative. Federal Radio Comm'n v. General
Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1929). Chief Justice Taney stated, "The
interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary
duties of the executive departments of the government would be
productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied that
such a power was never intended to be given to them." Decatur v.
Paulding,89 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840); accord, Keim v. United
States, 177 U.S. 290 (1899); see also, Boynton v. Blaine, 189 U.S. 806
(1890), United States ex rel. Redfield v. Windom, 187 U.S. 686
(1891); United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40 (1888).
Consequently it would at first glance appear that a federal narcotics
agent, who is an employee of the Treasury Department, a subdivision of the executive branch of the government, would be beyond
the jurisdiction of the generally recognized supervisory powers of
the federal courts. One would therefore be inclined to agree with
the dissent that the courts do not share with the executive department the responsibility of supervising law enforcement activities
as such. However, a closer examination of the authorities reveals
that in an important decision the Supreme Court, though refusing
to admit certain evidence as illegally obtained, stated that, "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence." McNabb v. United
States, 818 U.S. 882 (1942). Therefore it is apparent that the
McNabb decision furnished the basis for the extension of the supervisory powers of the federal courts to a point beyond the inherent
supervisory powers of courts in general. Since the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure are now the standards of procedure and evidence in federal courts it follows from the McNabb decision that
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under the supervisory duty to maintain such standards the court
may enjoin any abuse of these rules by federal law enforcement
officers. However, the instant decision seems to go one step further.
Here a federal officer was enjoined from testifying in a state proceeding because his evidence was inadmissible in federal court.
There is no specific section of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbidding this practice. Nevertheless the majority was of
the opinion that to allow a federal agent to use, in the state court,
the fruits of his unlawful act would defeat the policy of the rules,
which in this instance is to protect the privacy of the citizen unless
the strict standards set for searches and seizures are satisfied. Query
whether the supervisory powers as set forth in the McNabb case
should be extended this far. In that case the Court itself placed a
limitation upon its supervisory jurisdiction in stating, "We confine
ourselves to our limited function as the court of ultimate review
of the standards formulated and applied by federal courts in the
trial of criminal cases. We are not concerned with law enforcement
practices except in so far as courts themselves become instruments
of law enforcement." Therefore the question seems to be whether
the court in the principal case was necessarily in a position to become such an "instrument." As the dissent points out, it does not
seem to be enough that an invalid court process was involved for
there is no indication that the result would have been different
had there been no warrant at all. The majority seems to ignore
completely this limitation of the McNabb decision.
The dissent also takes the view that the majority opinion results
in a serious departure from the concepts which have formerly been
considered to govern state and federal relationships. It has been
held that the Supreme Court will not interfere with state agencies
or the enforcement of state law unless there is involved a violation
of the Federal Constitution. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117
(1951). Technically, the Court in the instant case is not violating
the rule of the Stejanelli decision since the only action of the Court
is that of enjoining a federal officer. However, it is obvious that by
enjoining this testimony which forms the basis for the state prosecution, the Court is doing indirectly what it has refused to do directly. Steffanelli v. Minard, supra.
While it is recognized that it may be as important to protect
and uphold the policy behind the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as it is to supervise their direct application, query as to
the advisability of doing so in this manner, which seems to infringe
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upon state law enforcement to an extent generally thought to be
beyond the authority of federal courts.
T. E. P.
CnmmiNAL LAW-FELONY-MURDER-STATtORY

INTERP=EATION.

-D and B committed an armed robbery upon X. As they fled from
the scene X killed B. Held, (remanding the case for a new trial),
that D can be convicted of murder under the felony-murder statute
(4-3 decision). Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 689, 117 A.2d
204 (1955).
Decisions in the United States on the felony-murder rule are
divided into four categories: (1) Some states follow the rule that,
if a killing occurs in the commission of a felony it is murder. The
states which follow this rule do not require that the felony be one
of violence. (2) A homicide committed in the perpetration of
certain dangerous felonies is ipso facto declared to be murder.
(3) A homicide committed in the commission of a felony is murder
only when the act itself is one involving extreme risk to human
life, and it is believed that the risk must be known to the actor.
(4) Apparently Ohio refuses to recognize the felony-murder doctrine in any form. MoRm_4zm, LAw oF HOMIC=E 48-49 (1952).
Pennsylvania would seem to be in the second category. According to the language of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon
1939) "All murder... which shall be committed in the perpetration of any ... robbery ... shall be murder in the first degree".
(Emphasis supplied.)
The principal case presents two problems. First, how far can
the courts go in imputing to the defendant the occurrence of death,
where such occurrence was not intended and only remotely connected with the defendants scheme? Second, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is it necessary that the occurrence of death be
(common law) murder in order to be raised to felony-murder
(first degree), or does any killing, short of common law murder,
satisfy the statute?
In earlier cases the Pennsylvania judges had specifically
charged the juries that, if they believe that the death during commission of a felony resulted from another's act, they should acquit
the defendant. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl.
97 (1936); Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 839, 144 AUt. 534
(1928). Two later cases, Commonwealth v. Moyer (Byron), 357 Pa.
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